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Abstract
The scale and complexity of computer-based safety critical systems, like those used in the transport and
manufacturing industries, pose significant challenges for failure analysis. Over the last decade, research
has focused on automating this task. In one approach, predictive models of system failure are
constructed from the topology of the system and local component failure models using a process of
composition.  An alternative approach employs model-checking of state automata to study the effects
of failure and verify system safety properties.
In this paper, we discuss these two approaches to failure analysis. We then focus on Hierarchically
Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) - one of the more advanced
compositional approaches - and discuss its capabilities for automatic synthesis of fault trees,
combinatorial Failure Modes and Effects Analyses, and reliability versus cost optimisation of systems
via application of automatic model transformations.
We summarise these contributions and demonstrate the application of HiP-HOPS on a simplified fuel
oil system for a ship engine. In light of this example, we discuss strengths and limitations of the
method in relation to other state-of-the-art techniques. In particular, because HiP-HOPS is deductive in
nature, relating system failures back to their causes, it is less prone to combinatorial explosion and can
more readily be iterated. For this reason, it enables exhaustive assessment of combinations of failures
and design optimisation using computationally greedy meta-heuristics.
1 Introduction
Increasing complexity in the design of modern engineering systems challenges the applicability of rule-
based design and classical safety and reliability analysis techniques. As new technologies introduce
complex failure modes, classical manual analysis of systems becomes increasingly difficult and error
prone.
To address these difficulties, we have developed a computerised tool called 'HiP-HOPS'
(Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin & Propagation Studies) that simplifies aspects of the
engineering and analysis process. The central capability of this tool is the automatic synthesis of Fault
Trees and Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEAs) by interpreting reusable specifications of
component failure in the context of a system model. The analysis is largely automated, requiring only
the initial component failure data to be provided, therefore reducing the manual effort required to
examine safety; at the same time, the underlying algorithms can scale up to analyse complex systems
relatively quickly, enabling the analysis of systems that would otherwise require partial or fragmented
manual analyses.
More recently, we have extended the above concept to solve a design optimisation problem: reliability
versus cost optimisation via selection and replication of components and alternative subsystem
architectures. HiP-HOPS employs genetic algorithms to evolve initial non-optimal designs into new
designs that better achieve reliability requirements with minimal cost. By selecting different component
implementations with different reliability and cost characteristics, or substituting alternative subsystem
architectures with more robust patterns of failure behaviour, many solutions from a large design space
can be explored and evaluated quickly.
Our hope is that these capabilities, used in conjunction with computer-aided design and modelling
tools, allow HiP-HOPS to facilitate the useful integration of a largely automated and simplified form of
safety and reliability analysis in the context of an improved design process. This in turn will, we hope,
address the broader issue of how to make safety a more controlled facet of the design so as to enable
early detection of potential hazards and to direct the design of preventative measures. The utilization of
the approach and tools has been shown to be beneficial in cases studies on engineering systems in the
shipping [1] and offshore industries [2].
This paper outlines these safety analysis and reliability optimisation technologies and their application
in an advanced and largely automated engineering process. In section 2 we discuss the context behind
these technologies and discuss some related approaches. In section 3, we describe how automatic safety
analysis can be performed using HiP-HOPS, and then in section 4 we relate the new optimisation
capabilities of HiP-HOPS. We apply these capabilities to a simplified marine fuel oil system in section
5, and highlight the benefits of using automated tools in this way. Finally in section 6 we discuss these
recent developments in HiP-HOPS and locate them in the context of other contemporary research in the
area, and then in section 7 we present our conclusions.
The paper makes two contributions: firstly, it gives a summary of the current state of HiP-HOPS,
focusing on recent work on optimisation, and relates this approach to the present state of the art;
secondly, it presents a case study on optimisation of system architecture using genetic algorithms and
shows how this technique can automate, rationalise and simplify the classical cost benefit analysis that
drives decisions about system optimisation.  The example provides an opportunity to discuss strengths
and limitations of HiP-HOPS in relation to other state-of-the-art techniques. We show that HiP-HOPS
is less prone to combinatorial explosion and can therefore be used for design optimisation using
computationally greedy meta-heuristics.
2 Safety Analysis & Reliability Optimisation
2. 1 Classical Safety Analysis Techniques: FTA & FMEA
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [3] and FMEA [4] are well-known and widely used system analysis
techniques used in reliability engineering. Both are long established – FMEA was formally introduced
in the late 1940s, and FTA has been around since the 1960s – and both have been employed in a
number of different areas, including the aerospace, nuclear power, and automotive industries. They are
methods that we can use to identify potential faults in a system, so that we can then use that
information to correct or prevent those faults.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a flexible technique, equally applicable to quantitative and qualitative
analyses, and easy to use and understand. Fault trees themselves are graphical representations of logical
combinations of failures, and show the relationship between a failure or fault and the events that cause
them. A fault tree normally consists of a top event, which is typically a system failure, connected to one
or more basic events via a system of logical gates, such as AND and OR. Basic events are usually
either component failures or events expected to happen as part of the normal operation of the system.
Analysis of the fault tree consists of two parts: qualitative (logical) analysis, and quantitative
(probabilistic) analysis. Qualitative analysis is performed by reducing the logical expression
represented by the fault tree into a set of minimal cut sets, which are the smallest possible combinations
of failures required to cause the top event. Quantitative analysis is performed by calculating the
probability of the top event given the probability of each of the basic events occurring.
In an FMEA, the basic process consists of compiling lists of possible component failure modes (all the
ways in which an entity may fail), gathered from descriptions of each part of the system, and then
trying to infer the effects of those failures on the rest of the system. Usually, these effects are evaluated
according to a number of criteria, such as severity, probability, and detectability, and often these
criteria are then combined into an overall estimate of risk. All of this data is then presented in the form
of a table which allows the analyst to quickly see what the effects of each failure mode are.
There are obvious differences between the two techniques, but one of the most fundamental is the
direction of the analysis. FTA is a deductive technique, which means it works from the top down –
assuming the system has failed, and then trying to work out why it failed. This is done by working
backwards to determine what possible combinations of events might have caused it; the system failure
then becomes the top event of the fault tree and the individual component failures form the basic
events, and they are all combined using a network of logical gates. FMEA, by contrast, is an inductive
technique, and works from the bottom up – assuming a component failure has occurred, and then trying
to work out what its effects would be. It involves proposing a certain event or condition, and then
trying to assess the effects of that initial event on the rest of the system. The end result is a table of
failures and their effects on the system, which provide the analyst with an overview of the possible
faults.
Both techniques are useful and provide a lot of valuable information about systems, and each can be
used to complement the other, but both suffer from the same flaw: they are primarily manual methods.
The process of performing these analyses can be laborious, especially for larger and more complex
systems. Whilst this provides the analyst with an in-depth knowledge of the system being studied, it
also makes application of these techniques error prone, and the results (once obtained) are often too
numerous to interpret efficiently. As a consequence, it is not uncommon for FTA and FMEA to take
place only once or twice in the life cycle of the system. This is unfortunate, because systems analysis
techniques like FTA and FMEA can be of great benefit during an iterative design process. By
estimating the reliability and gaining a more thorough understanding of the failure behaviour of the
system in each iteration, it is possible to see how the changes in design impact upon the overall safety
of the system. It also enables the analysts to identify and remedy potential flaws much earlier, thereby
saving both time and effort and producing a more reliable product.
However, before FTA or FMEA can be incorporated into the design cycle in this way, it is necessary to
overcome the difficulties inherent in such manual techniques. Experience from the aerospace and
process industries suggests that the application of classical safety analysis is hindered by the increasing
complexity of systems. For relatively simple systems, this is a manageable process, although fault trees
and FMEAs can rapidly become very elaborate. In complex systems, however, manual analysis is
laborious and error prone, and a thorough assessment and interpretation of the results becomes
increasingly difficult to achieve within the constraints of most projects. Furthermore, the results of the
analyses are divorced from the design being analysed, meaning that the effects of any changes in the
system design may only become apparent after another long and costly analysis.
While guidance is available on how technical justification for alternative designs and arrangements can
be provided in the form of engineering and safety analyses, such as FTA and FMEA, there is a need for
specific supporting measures and tools to assist in the application of such techniques. One obvious
approach would be to automate at least part of the process. This would mean that the analyses could be
carried out more quickly and efficiently, leaving more time for the results to be studied and allowing
more useful conclusions to be drawn.
2.2 Modern Safety Analysis Techniques & Tools
The deficiencies in manual safety analysis techniques like FTA and FMEA have not gone
unrecognised, and over the years a number of different tools and techniques have been established to
try to automate the process. Although pure analysis tools have a long history, e.g. FTA tools range
from modern examples like Fault Tree + [5] to more venerable tools like SETS [6], these typically
require the fault tree (or FMEA etc) to be built manually. Recently, however, tools have begun to
integrate more closely with the design process, allowing the synthesis of the fault models (i.e. fault
trees, FMEA) to be achieved automatically. This enables designers and safety analysts to better take
advantage of ever-increasing computer processing power and also helps to facilitate the reuse of
information as part of a more iterative design process in which safety becomes a driving factor.
Many of these tools and techniques have tended to fall into one of two categories [7]. The first category
consists of the compositional safety analysis approaches: the development of formal and semi-formal
languages to enable specification, composition, and analysis of system failure behaviour based on
safety information about the components that comprise the system. Although most are not fully
automated, in that they depend on the manual entry of the initial component failure data, they can be
usefully applied in the analysis of both hardware and software architectures in the context of a model-
based design process. The second category centres on adaptations of formal verification techniques to
support safety analysis. These tend to involve more rigorous modelling to enable model-checking and
related processes to take place, analysing the effects of failures by simulating them and verifying
whether or not the system meets its safety goals in the presence of those failures.
2.2.1 Compositional Safety Analysis Techniques
Perhaps the earliest compositional safety analysis technique, and one that has influenced those that
followed, is the Failure Propagation and Transformation Notation (FPTN), which emerged in the 1990s
[8]. It is a graphical description of the failure behaviour of the system, based around the idea of
component modules which describe the generation and propagation of component failures in the
system. These component modules are connected via inputs and outputs to other modules, allowing
combination and propagation of failures from one module to another, and they can be composed into
subsystems that can be used to build a system hierarchy. FPTN was designed to provide a bridge
between the deductive FTA and inductive FMEA processes, allowing both cause and effect to be
studied. However, FPTN's component module approach means building an error model that is separate
from the system model, which is then prone to becoming desynchronised from the original system it
represents as the design evolves [9]. As such, the original FPTN remained primarily a notation for
describing specifications of failure. Unlike HiP-HOPS, it was never extended with capabilities for
system analysis or design optimisation.
The concepts introduced in FPTN were taken further in the Fault Propagation and Transformation
Calculus (FPTC) [9], which was an attempt to overcome the deficiencies in FPTN. The main way in
which this was achieved was to link the failure model to the architectural model so that all
dependencies are identified and maintained. FPTC defines different failure classes (like omission,
commission, value errors etc) and these are specified in annotations directly in the components of the
system model. The inputs and outputs of those components are then used to transmit failure
information to the rest of the system by using a set of expressions that detail how failures are
transformed and propagated from input to output. Representing mitigation of failure is possible by
transforming a failure into normal behaviour. The failure propagation defined by these expressions and
the original model structure can then be evaluated as a token-passing network, determining the effects
of each component failure on the system as a whole. FPTC has also been extended [10] to permit
quantitative (probabilistic) analysis by including probability values in each expression. The major
advantage of FPTC over FPTN is that it uses the actual architectural model of the system, meaning that
any localised changes to the model do not require a new failure model to be built; instead, only a subset
of the failure expressions need updating. However, whereas FPTN was designed to support both
inductive and deductive analysis, FPTC is primarily inductive in nature, since it relies upon injecting
one failure or combination of failures into the system at a time and repeating the analysis. As a result,
the type of information given by an FTA is more difficult to achieve with FPTC and its inductive
nature makes it prone to combinatorial explosion, particularly for systems with large numbers of failure
modes.
Other approaches build upon the foundations laid by FPTN in other ways. Two such examples are
State-Event Fault Trees (SEFTs) [11, 12] and Component Fault Trees (CFTs) [13, 14]. In the CFT
approach, the failure logic of components is defined as a graph of interconnected fault trees using a
specification similar to that used in FPTN and HiP-HOPS. The CFTs themselves can be composed to
produce larger CFTs for subsystems to build the system hierarchy. Because CFTs are based on fault
trees, they are less prone to the problems with combinatorial explosion that afflicts FPTC. SEFTs are a
development of CFTs designed to overcome the static logic inherent in FTA and FMEA and enable
analysis of dynamic systems that feature transitions between different states. Whereas most
FTA/FMEA-based approaches feature only basic failure events, SEFTs distinguish between a system
being in a certain state (which is a condition that is true over a period of time) and an event that triggers
a state transition (which is an instantaneous occurrence); this makes SEFTs better suited to analysing
software systems or hardware systems with more complex dynamic behaviour. As with FPTC, failure
behaviour is modelled at the component level, but the simple Boolean logic of FPTC is extended to
enable the representation of sequences and histories of events, as well as the concept of negation (i.e.
an event that has not happened yet) using the NOT gate. However, this more complex logic means that
analysis of SEFTs is not possible using traditional FTA algorithms and instead relies upon a conversion
to Deterministic Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPNs) [15]. These DSPNs can then be quantitatively analysed
using Petri Net tools like TimeNET [16]. The disadvantage of modelling different states is that the
state-space can grow exponentially in larger models, reducing the scalability of the SEFT approach.
Finally, HiP-HOPS also falls into this category, since it is based upon the synthesis and analysis of
fault trees using compositional component failure data. However, it will be described in detail in
section 3 and its capabilities will be discussed and compared with other approaches in section 6.
2.2.2 Extensions of formal verification techniques for safety analysis
Another category of modern safety analysis techniques involves the use of formal modelling engines to
simulate the normal functioning of the system design and then inject faults to determine their effects on
the system. The benefit of this type of approach is that it does not typically require any additional
annotation (e.g. to describe the propagation of failures and component failure logic) as all required
information can be automatically extracted from the model, although this is only possible where
simulation data for the domain in question is available in the first place.
There are a number of different tools and techniques that fall into this category. Two of the best known
are FSAP-NuSMV [17] and Altarica [18]. Formal Safety Analysis Platform (FSAP) is a graphical
interface for the NuSMV-SA model checking & safety analysis engine; together they provide a single
environment for model design and safety analysis. It is capable of both injected fault simulation and
normal model checking processes like property verification and counter-example generation. FSAP-
NuSMV can be used to generate fault trees, although these fault trees essentially consist only of top
events and basic events and therefore link directly from effects to combinations of causes, although
they can also include NOT gates. Its main drawback, in common with the other model-checking
approaches, is its susceptibility to combinatorial explosion as the number of potential failure modes
increases.
Altarica is a formal modelling language that can describe complex hierarchical models [19]; it can also
model states and events and is therefore capable of representing the behaviour of dynamic or state-
based systems. As with SEFTs described above, Altarica can be used to generate Petri Nets as well as
static fault trees for non-dynamic systems. In both cases, the failure model is then analysed by external
tools. One issue with Altarica, as identified by Bieber in [18], is that it can be subject to loops of fault
propagation logic in the model, particularly when bidirectional signals or flows are involved. In these
cases, the SMV-based approach is usually employed instead [20].
There are other examples of this category, for example Model-based Deviation Analysis (MDA) [21]
and Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis (DCCA) [22]. MDA differs from the others in that it is
less concerned with system faults and instead attempts to model the effects of deviations of system
input data. It is an extension of the earlier Software Deviation Analysis [23] that seeks to relate
deviations of input data to deviations of output. MDA uses quantifiable limits and ranges that can be
formulated in temporal logic and then simulated using a model checker. By comparing simulations of
nominal data and error data, critical deviations from the normal can be detected and their causes
identified. One downside of MDA, however, is its requirement for two datasets (nominal and error),
although it is possible in some cases for these to be combined in the same model or environment.
DCCA is similar to the other model-checking approaches and uses mathematical proofs to verify
whether a component failure will lead to system failure. The behaviour of the system is defined using
finite automata and temporal logic; the system can then be simulated with regard to a set of component
faults and system hazards to determine whether those component faults will cause one or more of the
system hazards being investigated. The goal is to determine the minimal critical set, i.e. the smallest
combination of failure modes capable of causing a hazard. Other model checkers like SMV can also be
used to verify the proofs. DCCA offers some other advantages: it has been modified to work with an
industrial design tool, SCADE [24], and although it also suffers to a degree from combinatorial and
state-space explosion, this can be minimised by making prior use of more informal techniques like
classical FTA to determine failures of interest to investigate further. DCCA also features an extension
named DFOA (Deductive Failure Order Analysis) that enables analysis of dynamic systems using
temporal fault trees generated automatically from the system model [25].
2.2.3 Implications
Although both kinds of approach have advantages and disadvantages [26], e.g. in terms of the level of
automation, amount of detail provided, scalability to handle multiple failures in combination, or ability
to analyse dynamic systems with multiple states, all of them offer a distinct advantage over classical
manual techniques in that they can utilise tool support and therefore offer a much faster, more detailed
analysis. This makes it more practical to use these safety analysis techniques as part of the design
process, and in some cases multiple techniques can be used to complement each other.
However, if some portion of the design evolution is to be iterated automatically by using a model-based
optimisation algorithm, then the compositional safety analysis approach offers one significant
advantage over the formal approaches: performance. Although the compositional approaches require
the prior annotation of the model with failure logic, which can be time consuming, subsequent
synthesis and analysis of fault trees etc is typically very fast, since it normally operates in a deductive
manner and is less prone to combinatorial explosion. By contrast, although formal fault simulation
techniques like Altarica etc do not require this initial step, since the required information can be
automatically extracted from domain libraries of components with failure properties, the actual
simulation and analysis is typically inductive and therefore slower and more vulnerable to
combinatorial explosion. As a result, it is usually impractical to consider the effects of combinations of
failures, or at least more than two failures in conjunction.
Automatic design optimisation, e.g. with metaheuristics such as genetic algorithms, is an iterative
process that may require a model to be evaluated thousands or even millions of times. As a result, the
performance and therefore scalability of the evaluation technique is a critical factor. Furthermore, since
the evaluation is being used primarily to differentiate different potential design candidates, the level of
detail that can be provided by fault simulation approaches is often unnecessary. Therefore, the
compositional approaches tend to be better suited to this process; they can of course be complemented
by an analysis of certain promising design candidates using a fault simulation technique once the
optimisation has finished.
3 Automatic Optimisation of System Reliability
3.1 Need for automatic optimisation
As described above, modern safety analysis techniques permit a wealth of information about the safety
and reliability of a system to be gathered much more quickly and easily than ever before. This
information permits designers to use safety and reliability as a major factor in the decisions they make
during the evolution of a system design: by evaluating the effects of one or more potential design
choices, e.g. increased reliability at the expense of greater cost or increased weight etc, designers are
able to make informed choices.
However, just as classical manual safety analyses restrict the rate that information can be obtained
about a system, manually evaluating different design choices is time-consuming and restricts the
number of design candidates that can be investigated. If this process could be automated, it would be
possible to examine hundreds or thousands of potential design candidates – a much greater portion of
the total design space – and thus hopefully provide a better foundation for the next iteration of the
system design.
Unfortunately, even automation using modern computing technology is insufficient to examine the
total design space even for a relatively simple system with a limited number of substitutable
components. It is therefore not possible to evaluate every design candidate except in the most trivial of
cases. This is particularly the case if multiple methods of variability are taken into account, e.g.
swapping one subsystem architecture for another as well as just substituting one component for another
with an alternative implementation.
Furthermore, an additional issue is that system reliability is seldom the only concern of the designer:
the major constraint on any design is likely to be its cost, and as most characteristics of a system
increase, cost typically increases too. These conflicting goals – e.g. to increase reliability while
reducing cost – result in any design having to reach a careful balance between different objectives. Any
automated optimisation process must therefore take into account not just a single objective, but
multiple – and often contradictory – objectives.
3.2 Comparison of different optimisation approaches
There are a number of different optimisation algorithms available, most revolving around the use of
meta-heuristics intended to explore the design search space as extensively and as effectively as
possible; the aim is to find the optimal solutions as soon as possible but without getting trapped in one
local area of the search space (known as a 'local optimum').
One such algorithm is known as tabu search [27, 28]. Tabu search explores the design space on the
basis of evaluation functions, e.g. if one solution has better characteristics, it uses that one as the basis
for its next iteration. Multiple objectives can be evaluated by multiple functions in multiple iterations,
e.g. objective #1 in the first iteration, objective #2 in the second, and so forth. Furthermore, tabu search
remembers the solutions it has explored, preventing the algorithm from looping or getting stuck in a
local optimum; these are known as the taboo or tabu solutions and force the algorithm to focus on
unexplored areas of the search space. The list is typically finite, however, and eventually the oldest
members of the list are removed. After a set number of iterations, the best solution(s) found so far are
presented as the results.
A different approach is the ant colony approach, which is based on the behaviour of ant colonies in
nature [29, 30]. Ants use pheromone trails to establish and navigate efficient routes between food
sources and their nest; poor routes disappear over time as less ants use them, while good routes are
reinforced by more and more ants using them. Ant colony optimisation works in the same way: in each
iteration, one solution is used as the base and the neighbouring solutions are explored by the 'ants'.
Good solutions are reinforced and in the next iteration, the best solution found is used as the next base
or 'nest'.
Simulated annealing is another technique, this time based on metallurgical annealing (i.e. controlling
the rate of cooling in metal to encourage the atoms in the metal to form stronger shapes) [31]. In
simulated annealing, the current solution is changed in some random way to obtain a different solution;
whether or not that new solution is accepted depends on the global temperature: a hot temperature
allows more radical changes, a cool temperature permits only minor changes. At each stage, the most
optimal solution is chosen from those allowed, and then the temperature is lowered and the process
continues.
Another approach is to use genetic algorithms [32]. Genetic algorithms are designed to mimic the
evolution of biological life in nature: a population of different candidates are evaluated according to
their fitness and the best are chosen to reproduce and form the basis of the next generation of
candidates. Each candidate is represented using a 'genetic' encoding, which describes its characteristics;
when two candidates are chosen to produce a new design candidate, their encodings are subjected to
crossover, i.e. the encoding of the new design is a mix of the encodings of its ancestor candidates. This
promotes convergence on optimal solutions by ensuring 'survival of the fittest'. In addition, random
mutation is included to allow a greater portion of the search space to be explored and to try to limit the
likelihood of becoming stuck in a local optimum.
There are different versions of genetic algorithms tailored towards different goals. One form of genetic
algorithm is the penalty-based approach; in this form, the multiple objectives are combined into a
single function. One objective (e.g. reliability) is optimised, but constraints on the other objectives (e.g.
cost, weight etc) are imposed and any infringement of those constraints incurs a penalty which is
subtracted from the fitness score for the candidate. Thus if two potential solutions have the same
reliability, but one violates the constraints, it is ranked lower than the one that does not violate the
constraints. The penalty incurred can be tweaked so that the design space is not too confined, e.g. by
having smaller penalties at the start of the optimisation and steadily increasing them as time goes on,
which can result in better solutions [33].
Another form of genetic algorithm is the Non-Dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA-II) [34],
which is a true multi-objective approach (as opposed to the penalty-based approach, which combines
multiple objectives into one). Full multi-objective approaches tend to be better at exploring the design
space more widely, albeit typically with a performance penalty, since more evaluation is taking place.
NSGA-II works by constructing a multi-dimensional graph plotting the current solutions in the
population, as in the example of Figure 1.
Figure 1: Dominated & non-dominated solutions
For a given solution B, if there is another solution A that is better in at least one objective and no worse
in any others, then solution B is said to be dominated by A. The set of all non-dominated solutions is
known as the Pareto front, and is the set of currently identified optimal solutions. These represent
different trade-offs between the multiple objectives, e.g. one might have the best reliability for a given
high cost, whereas another might have the lowest cost for a lower reliability value; at one extreme the
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Pareto front would contain the cheapest solution and at the other extreme it would contain the most
reliable. The nature of the Pareto front means that it is not possible to move from one solution to
another without sacrificing at least one objective, e.g. one could not choose a more reliable solution
from the Pareto front without also increasing cost (or some other objective). The Pareto front can be
managed using different techniques to ensure a good base population for the next generation, e.g. by
pruning out clusters of similar solutions (so the Pareto solutions remain more widely spread out over
the search space).
3.3 Choosing an optimisation algorithm
Although there are many different optimisation techniques – and many variations of individual
techniques – for the purposes of design optimisation, the most suitable techniques are those that allow
multiple objectives to be considered, since safety and/or reliability are rarely the only factors being
considered. In particular, cost is typically a critical factor, and depending on the nature of the system,
other objectives like weight, volume, or timing (i.e. performance of software) may form elements of the
optimisation as well.
For our purposes in HiP-HOPS, we developed a modification of the NSGA-II variant of the genetic
algorithm approach. Genetic algorithms offer one of the best balances between design space
exploration and convergence on optimal solutions because of the combination of the crossover and
mutation operators. They are also readily adaptable to multiple objectives. Although different multi-
objective genetic algorithms exist, e.g. PESA-II and SPEA2, NSGA-II is regarded as efficient and
well-tested [35] and it is more open to modification than some of the others. The optimisation process
used in HiP-HOPS is described in more detail in section 4.
4 Safety Analysis using HiP-HOPS
HiP-HOPS is a compositional safety analysis tool that takes a set of local component failure data,
which describes how output failures of those components are generated from combinations of internal
failure modes and deviations received at the components' inputs, and then synthesises fault trees that
reflect the propagation of failures throughout the whole system. From those fault trees, it can generate
both qualitative and quantitative results as well as a multiple failure mode FMEA [36].
A HiP-HOPS study of a system design typically has three main phases:
• Modelling Phase: system modelling & failure annotation
• Synthesis Phase: fault tree synthesis
• Analysis Phase: fault tree analysis & FMEA synthesis
Although the first phase remains primarily manual in nature, the other phases are fully automated. The
general process in HiP-HOPS is illustrated in Figure 2 below:
Figure 2: Overview of the HiP-HOPS Process
The first phase – system modelling & failure annotation – consists of developing a model of the system
(including hydraulic, electrical or electronic, mechanical systems, as well as conceptual block and data
flow diagrams) and then annotating the components in that model with failure data. This phase is
carried out using an external modelling tool or package compatible with HiP-HOPS. HiP-HOPS has
interfaces to a number of different modelling tools, including Matlab Simulink, Eclipse-based UML
tools, and particularly SimulationX. The latter is an engineering modelling & simulation tool developed
by ITI GmbH [37] with a fully integrated interface to HiP-HOPS. This has the advantage that existing
system models, or at least models that would have been developed anyway in the course of the design
process, can also be reused for safety analysis purposes rather than having to develop a new model
specific to safety.
The second phase is the fault tree synthesis process. In this phase, HiP-HOPS automatically traces the
paths of failure propagation through the model by combining the local failure data for individual
components and subsystems. The result is a network of interconnected fault trees defining the
relationships between failures of system outputs and their root causes in the failure modes of individual
components. It is a deductive process, working backwards from the system outputs to determine which
components caused those failures and in what logical combinations.
The final phase involves the analysis of those fault trees and the generation of an FMEA. The fault
trees are first minimised to obtain the minimal cut sets – the smallest possible combinations of failures
capable of causing any given system failure – and these are then used as the basis of both quantitative
analysis (to determine the probability of a system failure) and the FMEA, which directly relates
individual component failures to their effects on the rest of the system. The FMEA takes the form of a
table indicating which system failures are caused by each component failure.
The various phases of a HiP-HOPS safety analysis will now be described in more detail.
4.1 Modelling Phase
HiP-HOP studies can be performed on any model of a system that identifies components and the
material, energy or data transactions among those components. Typically these models will have been
produced in a modelling tool such as Matlab Simulink or SimulationX. In addition, the models can be
defined hierarchically, using a composition of components and subsystems, to help manage
complexity. Failures can therefore propagate 'vertically' through the hierarchy as well as horizontally
through the system.
Once a model has been obtained, it is necessary to annotate it with failure data. At its core, HiP-HOPS
operates on the idea that an output failure of a component is caused by a logical combination of input
failures and internal faults and that the output failure will then propagate along structural connections
in the model to another component to be received as a new input failure. Thus for the purposes of the
safety analysis, each component in the model needs to be annotated with its own local failure data,
describing how that component can fail and how it responds to failures propagated from other
components in the system.
The local failure data takes the form of a set of failure expressions relating failures at a component's
outputs (known as output deviations) to a logical combination of internal failure modes (basic events)
and input deviations (i.e. failures received at the component's inputs). For the specification of input and
output deviations, a generic and abstract syntax was developed, consisting of two parts; the first part is
the failure class, an identifier that describes the type of failure, and the second is the input or output
port at which the failure is received or propagated. There are different ways of classifying failures, e.g.
by relating them to the function of the component, or by classifying according to the degree of failure –
complete, partial, intermittent etc [38]. In general, however, the failure of a component will have
adverse local effects on the outputs of the component which, in turn, may cause further effects
travelling though the system on material, energy or data exchanged with other components. Therefore
in HiP-HOPS, we generally classify the effects into one of three main failure classes, all equally
applicable to material, energy or data outputs: omissions, i.e. the failure to provide the input or output;
commissions, i.e. a condition in which the input or output is provided inadvertently and in the wrong
context of operation; and finally malfunctions, a general condition in which the input or output is
provided but in a form which deviates from the design intention, e.g. with a value that exceeds
thresholds or is transmitted at the wrong time. Since this classification adopts a functional viewpoint
which is independent of technology, it could provide a common basis for describing component
failures and their local effects. However, HiP-HOPS can work with any classification of failures as
long as it is used consistently from one component to the next, and indeed it allows users to define their
own failure classes.
In HiP-HOPS, failure classes are often abbreviated, e.g. O = Omission, C = Commission, V = Value
etc, and combined with the name of the port at which they occur, thus "O-input1" might be an omission
of input at port "input1". Sometimes it is useful to parameterise the failure class as well, e.g. OF for
omission of flow or HP for high pressure etc. HiP-HOPS also makes use of the standard Boolean logic
operators AND and OR to combine input deviations and basic events and then relate these to a given
output deviation, e.g. "O-out1 = O-in1 OR internalFailure" is an expression that describes how an
omission of output is caused by a corresponding omission of input or some internal failure of the
component itself. Internal failure modes typically depend on the domain, e.g. a blockage for a hydraulic
system or a short circuit in an electrical system etc. Note that failure classes can also be transformed
from input to output; for example, if a particular component was designed to fail silent in response to
input errors, it may transform value input failures into an omission of output: "O-out = V-in OR C-in"
etc. In this way, mitigation of failures can also be represented.
The set of failure expressions for a component therefore describes all possible deviations of all outputs
for that component in terms of its possible internal failure modes and any relevant deviations at its
inputs (which are in turn propagated from output deviations of other components). In addition to the
logical information, it is possible to add numerical data for the failure modes of the component,
detailing the probability of the occurrence each failure. HiP-HOPS allows multiple different
probabilistic models to be used, e.g. constant failure & repair rates, MTTF & MTTR values, Binomial
and Poisson distributions, dormant failures, and Weibull variable failure rates etc. This provides a great
deal of flexibility when modelling the quantitative aspects of component failure (assuming the
probability data for the failure modes are available). This data is later used to arrive at an estimate of
the unavailability for each system failure.
The local failure data – both the logical expressions and the probabilistic data – can also be stored in a
component library, allowing it to be reused in other system models and thereby reducing the time
needed for failure annotations of future systems. Since the failure data is local to each component, there
are no dependencies on other components that would complicate their reuse.
As an example of local component failure data in HiP-HOPS, Figure 3 below shows an analysis of a
computer controlled valve. The figure shows the valve as it might be illustrated in a plant diagram and
records the results of the local safety analysis of the component in two tables that define the internal
failure modes of the valve and its output deviations respectively.
Figure 3: Local failure data for a valve
In normal operation, the valve is normally closed and opens only when the computer control signal has
a continuously maintained value of a logical one. Valve malfunctions include mechanical failures such
as the valve being stuckOpen or stuckClosed, and blockages caused by debris such as blocked and
partiallyBlocked. For each malfunction, the analysis records estimated failure and repair rates while the
effects of those malfunctions on the output of the valve can be seen in a second table that lists output
deviations.
This specification of failure modes is generic in the sense that it does not contain references to the
context within which the valve operates. Failure expressions make references only to internal
malfunctions and input/output ports of the component. The failure behaviour described in these
expressions has been derived assuming a simple function that we expect the component to perform in
every application (valve is normally closed unless the value of control signal is 1). For these reasons,
the specification of the valve in the figure above provides a template that could be re-used in different
models and contexts of operation, perhaps with some modifications, e.g. on failure rates, to reflect a
different environment.
4.2 Synthesis Phase
As explained above, the local failure data for each component relates deviations of its outputs to
combinations of input deviations and internal component malfunctions – effectively a set of small fault
trees describing the failures of the component. When we examine a component out of system context,
input and output deviations represent only potential conditions of failure. However, when we place the
component in a model of a system, the input deviations specified in the analysis can actually be
triggered by other components further upstream in the model and the specified output deviations can
similarly cause more failures further downstream.
Thus by linking the output failures of a certain class from one component to the input failures of that
same failure class at another component, via the architectural connections and interactions stored in the
model, it is possible to map out the global propagation of failures through the system as a whole in the
form of a series of interconnected fault trees. Thus the causes of a significant hazard or failure at the
output of the system can be traced back through this propagation by simply analysing the fault trees
and determining the minimal cut sets.
This process of synthesising fault trees from the component failure data (which are effectively mini
fault trees) is automated by HiP-HOPS. The fault trees are constructed incrementally, working
backwards from the outputs of the system (e.g. electromechanical actuators) towards the system inputs
(e.g. material/energy resources, operators, and data sensors etc) and joining causes of failures in one
component to their effects in another. At each stage, the mini fault trees representing the local failure
data of a component are added to the tree being generated; note that HiP-HOPS will allow branches of
the fault tree to be shared if they are traversed more than once, rather than duplicating them. Figure 4
below illustrates this process, showing how the local failure data is connected together to form a larger
system fault tree.
Figure 4: Connecting local failure data together to synthesise fault trees
In this way, an overall view of the global propagation of failure in the system can be automatically
captured by traversing the model and by following the causal links specified in the local safety analyses
of the components. Note that the mechanically synthesised fault trees produced record the propagation
of failure in a very strict and methodical way, starting from an output failure and following
dependencies between components in the model to systematically record other component failures that
progressively contribute to this event. The logical structure of the tree is determined only by
interconnections between the components and the local analyses of those components. This logical
structure is straightforward and can be easily understood, unlike the structure of many manually
constructed fault trees, which is often defined by implicit assumptions made by analysts.
To manage complex hierarchical models effectively, the synthesis algorithm in HiP-HOPS will
perform traversals both across the vertical and horizontal axis of the design hierarchy, allowing the
annotation of the system hierarchy at all levels of the design. If, for example, a subsystem as a whole is
susceptible to a failure mode, then the effect of this condition can be directly specified with a failure
annotation at subsystem level. This annotation, for example, could define that all outputs of the
subsystem are omitted in the event of a global disturbance, e.g. in the case of electromagnetic
interference. Such annotations would typically complement other annotations made at the level of the
enclosed components to describe aspects of failure behaviour at this level (e.g. the mechanical and
electrical failure modes of each component). In general, when examining the causes of a failure at an
output of a subsystem, the fault tree synthesis algorithm creates a disjunction between any failure logic
specified at subsystem level and logic arising from the enclosed lower levels.
HiP-HOPS is also designed to recognise and handle loops in the model that create circular references to
the same failure logic (e.g. conditions such as: event A is caused by event B which in turn is caused by
event A). When such circles are encountered, the failure logic contained in the circle is only
incorporated once in the fault trees. At the same time, a warning note is generated in order to encourage
the analyst to investigate whether or not the circular logic in the system was valid or the result of a
modelling error. In general it is normally possible in the steady state to determine what the final effect
on the system will be of an initiating failure further upstream.
4.3 Analysis Phase
In the final phase, the synthesised system fault trees are analysed, both qualitatively and quantitatively,
and from these results a multiple failure mode FMEA is generated. Firstly, the fault trees undergo
qualitative analysis to obtain their minimal cut sets, which reduces them in size and complexity. This is
achieved using various logical reduction techniques, i.e. applying logical rules to reduce the complexity
of the expressions and remove any redundancies. Once the minimal cut sets have been obtained, they
are analysed quantitatively, which produces unavailability values for the top events of each fault tree.
The last step is to combine all of the data produced into an FMEA, which is a table that concisely
illustrates the results. The FMEA shows the direct relationships between component failures and
system failures, and so it is possible to see both how a failure for a given component affects everything
else in the system and also how likely that failure is. A classical FMEA only shows the direct effects of
single failure modes on the system, but because of the way this FMEA is generated from a series of
fault trees, HiP-HOPS is not restricted in the same way, and the FMEAs produced also show what the
further effects of a failure mode are; these are the effects that the failure has on the system when it
occurs in conjunction with other failure modes. Figure 5 below shows this concept:
Figure 5: Converting networks fault trees into a multiple failure mode FMEA
In the figure, F1 and F2 are system failures, and C1 – C9 are component failures. For C3, C4, C6 and
C7, there are no direct effects on the system – that is, if only one of these components fail, nothing
happens. However, they do have further effects; for example, C3 and C4 both occurring in conjunction
will cause F1 to occur. The FMEAs produced thus show all of the effects on the system, either singly
or in combination, of a particular component failure mode. This is especially useful because it allows
the designer to identify failure modes that contribute to multiple system failures (e.g. C5 in the
example). These common cause failures represent especially vulnerable points in the system, and are
prime candidates for redundancy or substitution with more reliable components.
4.4 Tool support
Although HiP-HOPS has interfaces with a number of different modelling tools, the most advanced,
fully-featured interface is with the SimulationX modelling & simulation tool from ITI GmbH. A
commercial version of HiP-HOPS is also available with SimulationX.
Simulation X provides a Graphical User Interface (GUI) that enables annotation of components in the
model with the failure modes and failure expressions required for the fault tree and FMEA synthesis.
The data becomes part of the model and is automatically saved and retrieved by SimulationX. Failure
annotations are stored together with the component in component libraries and can be re-used either
directly or following modifications within the same model or across different models with the obvious
benefit of simplifying the manual part of the analysis. When an analysis takes place, SimulationX
generates an output file that is parsed by HiP-HOPS, which then reconstructs the enclosed annotated
models for the purposes of fault tree synthesis and analysis. After HiP-HOPS analyses the fault trees, it
generates output files containing the fault trees, the cut sets and unavailability (if available), and the
direct and further effects FMEA tables. The direct effects table is a single failure mode FMEA which
shows, for each failure mode of each component in the system, the direct effects on the system. Further
effects caused by conjunctions of component failure modes are shown in a second table which presents
a lengthier and more detailed multiple failure mode FMEA analysis. The output is created by a HTML
generator, which produces web pages containing the tables of data. The advantages of this medium
include easy distribution and display and the ability, through hyperlinks, to navigate different aspects
of the information. The various interfaces of the tool are shown below in Figure 6:
Figure 6: SimulationX & HiP-HOPS tool interfaces
5 Design Optimisation using HiP-HOPS
HiP-HOPS analysis may show that safety, reliability and cost requirements have been met, in which
case the proposed system design can be realised. In practice, though, this analysis will often indicate
that certain requirements cannot be met by the current design, in which case the design will need to be
revised. This is a problem commonly encountered in the design of reliable or safety critical systems.
Designers of such systems usually have to achieve certain levels of safety and reliability while working
within cost constraints. Design is a creative exercise that relies on the technical skills of the design
team and also on experience and lessons learnt from successful earlier projects, and thus the bulk of
design work is creative. However, we believe that further automation can assist the process of iterating
the design by aiding in the selection of alternative components or subsystem architectures as well as in
the replication of components in the model, all of which may be required to ensure that the system
ultimately meets its safety and reliability requirements with minimal cost.
A higher degree of reliability and safety can often be achieved by using a more reliable and expensive
component, an alternative subsystem design (e.g. a primary/standby architecture), or by using
replicated components or subsystems to achieve redundancy and therefore ensure that functions are still
provided when components or subsystems fail. In a typical system design, however, there are many
options for substitution and replication at different places in the system and different levels of the
design hierarchy. It may be possible, for example, to achieve the same reliability by substituting two
sensors in one place and three actuators in another, or by replicating a single controller or control
subsystem etc. Different solutions will, however, lead to different costs, and the goal is not only to
meet the safety goals and cost constraints but also to do so optimally, i.e. find designs with maximum
possible reliability for the minimum possible cost. Because the options for replication and/or
substitution in a non-trivial design are typically too many to consider manually, it is virtually
impossible for designers to address this problem systematically; as a result, they must rely on intuition,
or on evaluation of a few different design options. This means that many other options – some of which
are potentially superior – are neglected. Automation of this process could therefore be highly useful in
evaluating a lot more potential design alternatives much faster than a designer could do so manually.
Recent extensions to HiP-HOPS have made this possible by allowing design optimisation to take place
automatically [39]. HiP-HOPS is now capable of employing genetic algorithms in order to
progressively "evolve" an initial design model that does not meet requirements into a design where
components and subsystem architectures have been selected and where redundancy has been allocated
in a way that minimizes cost while achieving given safety and reliability requirements. In the course of
the evolutionary process, the genetic algorithm typically generates populations of candidate designs
which employ user-defined alternative implementations for components and subsystems as well as
standard replication strategies. These strategies are based on widely used fault tolerant schemes such as
hot or cold standbys and n-modular redundancy with majority voting.
For the algorithm to progress towards an optimal solution, a selection process is applied in which the
fittest designs survive and their genetic makeup is passed to the next generation of candidate designs.
The fitness of each design relies on cost and reliability. To calculate fitness, therefore, we need ways in
which to automatically calculate those two elements. An indication of the cost of a system can be
calculated as the sum of the costs of its components (although for more accurate calculations, life-cycle
costs should also be taken into account, e.g. production, assembly and maintenance costs) [40].
However, while calculation of cost is relatively easy to automate, the automation of the evaluation of
safety or reliability is more difficult as conventional methods rely on manual construction of the
reliability model (e.g. the fault tree, reliability block diagram or the FMEA). HiP-HOPS, by contrast,
already automates the development and calculation of the reliability model, and therefore facilitates the
evaluation of fitness as a function of reliability (or safety). This in turn enables a selection process
through which the genetic algorithm can progress towards an optimal solution which can achieve the
required safety and reliability at minimal cost.
One issue with genetic algorithms is that it has to be possible to represent the individuals in the
population – in this case, the design candidates – as genetic encodings in order to facilitate crossover
and mutation. Typically this is done by assigning integers to different alternatives in specific positions
in the encoding string, e.g. a system consisting of three components may be represented by an encoding
string of three digits, the value of each of which represents one possible implementation for those
components. However, although this is sufficient if the model has a fixed, flat topology, it is rather
inflexible and cannot easily handle systems with subsystems, replaceable sub-architectures, and
replication of components, since this would also require changing the number of digits in the encoding
string.
The solution used in HiP-HOPS is to employ a tree encoding, which is a hierarchical rather than linear
encoding that can more accurately represent the hierarchical structure of the system model. Each
element of the encoding string is not simply just a number with a fixed set of different values, it can
also represent another tree encoding itself. Figure 7 shows these different possibilities: we may wish to
allow component A to be replaced with either a low cost, low reliability implementation (represented
as 1), a high cost, high reliability implementation (2), or an entirely new subsystem with a
primary/standby configuration (3). If the third implementation is selected, then a new sub-encoding is
used, which may contain further values for the components that make up the new subsystem, i.e. the
primary and the standby:
Figure 7: Three different implementations of a component
Thus encoding "1" means that the first implementation was chosen, encoding "2" means the second
was chosen, "3(11)" means that the third was chosen (the subsystem) and furthermore that the two
subcomponents both use implementation 1, while "3(21)" for example means that the primary
component in the subsystem uses implementation 2 instead. Although the tree encoding is more
complex, it is also much more flexible and allows a far greater range of configuration options to be
used during the optimisation process.
HiP-HOPS uses a variant of the NSGA-II algorithm for optimisation. The original NSGA-II algorithm
allows for both undominated and dominated solutions to exist in the population (i.e. the current set of
design candidates). To help decide which solutions pass on their characteristics to the next generation,
they are ranked according to the number of other solutions they dominate. The more dominant
solutions are more likely to be used than the less dominant solutions. HiP-HOPS is also able to discard
all but the dominant solutions. This is known as a pure-elitist algorithm (since all but the best solutions
are discarded) and also helps to improve performance.
To further enhance the quality of solutions and the speed with which they can be found, a number of
other modifications were made. One improvement was to maintain a solution archive similar to those
maintained by tabu search and ant colony optimisation; this has the benefit of ensuring that good
solutions are not accidentally lost during subsequent generations. Another improvement was to allow
constraints to be taken into account during the optimisation process, similar to the way the penalty-
based optimisation functions: the algorithm is encouraged to maintain solutions within the constraints
and solutions outside, while permitted, are penalised to a varying degree. In addition, younger solutions
– i.e. ones more recently created – are preferred over ones that have been maintained in the population
for a longer period; again, this helps to ensure a broader search of the design space by encouraging new
solutions to be created rather than reusing existing ones.
6 Example: Optimisation of a marine fuel oil system
To demonstrate the application of design optimisation in practice, we applied the optimisation
capabilities of HiP-HOPS to a simplified fuel oil service system for a cargo ship. When the fuel oil
system fails, there is a loss of engine propulsion that can lead to the ship becoming grounded as a result
of drifting. The base design – with no component replication or substitution – is shown in Figure 8
below:
Figure 8: Fuel Oil system – basic design
This system was annotated with failure data and cost information in the SimulationX interface,
allowing a standard HiP-HOPS analysis to take place. It was also further augmented with information
to define the design search space, by specifying which components could be replicated (all but the main
engine). For our preliminary experiments, we restricted the potential optimisations types to simple
replication to achieve a maximum of triple redundancy (i.e. 0, 1, or 2 replicants); as a result, only a
single set of cost & failure data was needed (since each replication is a simple duplication). This data is
displayed in the table below.
Table 1: Cost & Failure data for the Fuel Oil system
Components Cost Failure Rate
Indicator filter 1500 5.0E-7
Viscosimeter 2500 2.5E-6
Pre-heater 2000 6.7E-6
Circulation pump 6000 3.2E-5
Mixing tank 2000 1.6E-5
Flow meter 2000 1.0E-5
Automatic filter 2000 1.0E-5
Booster pump 5000 3.2E-5
Service tank 1500 1.6E-5
At first a manual attempt at optimisation was made by the designer. Even with the scope for
optimisation being restricted to only replication of components, the search space still contains 19683
possible solutions; only 12 were actually considered during the manual analysis. HiP-HOPS then
performed a normal reliability and cost analysis on each of these solutions, and then the designer
carried out a cost-benefit analysis by weighing the total system cost of each solution against the cost of
a grounding occurring due to failure of the fuel oil system (this is the product of the system
unavailability and the physical cost of losing the ship). The system with the best cost-benefit ratio was
selected as the reference solution, shown below in Figure 9:
Figure 9: Fuel Oil system – manually optimised design
This system has a cost of 45000 and an unavailability of 3x10-6. This then established a baseline to
compare with the results of the automatic optimisation.
Unlike the manual optimisation, HiP-HOPS was not restricted to investigating a small number of
candidates. 50 generations of optimisation took place, discovering 46 non-dominated (Pareto)
solutions. These 46 solutions are plotted in a graph in Figure 10 below (as crosses), alongside the 12
manually investigated solutions (circles).
Figure 10: Plotting the Pareto Front
As can be seen, most of the manually investigated solutions are dominated by the Pareto solutions
discovered by the automatic optimisation process. Another cost-benefit analysis was then carried out
on these solutions to determine which offered best value for money.
Figure 11: Cost-benefit analysis of the automatic optimisation solutions
The optimal solution (offering the lowest cost) is highlighted. It has a slightly higher unavailability
(9.7x10-6) but the cost is only 43000 as opposed to 45000. The difference is that only one heater is
used, rather than the two found in the reference solution shown in Figure 11.
Next we lifted the restrictions on the optimisation process, allowing 3 different alternative
implementations of each of the components to be selected, each with different costs and failure rates.
This increased the search space to 20,661,046,784 different possible solutions. Clearly, the percentage
of these solutions that could be investigated manually is extremely small.
Automatic optimisation using HiP-HOPS discovered 366 non-dominated solutions in 4000 generations,
plotted in Figure 12 below:
Figure 12: Plotting the larger Pareto Front
As before, a cost benefit analysis was carried out on the Pareto solutions. The results of that analysis
are shown in Figure 13 below; the chart has been zoomed in to show detail around the optimum area.
Figure 13: New cost-benefit analysis
Being able to consider alternative components for each of the subsystems allows a new optimum
configuration. This is shown in Figure 14 below, where the automatic filter and the flow meter have a
single component, alternative version 3 and 2 respectively, in place of a redundant configuration.
Figure 14: Fuel Oil system – optimal design
The system’s unavailability of 1.17x10-5 is worse than the previous two best solutions, but the
component cost is only 41529.
Although the above is only a relatively small and simple example, the search space for even this system
is still prohibitively large; it would not be possible to explore more than a tiny fraction of it using a
manual optimisation process, and thus it is unlikely that the designer would have been able to identify
any truly optimal solutions. By contrast, automatic optimisation enabled the designer to explore many
more solutions and resulted in a set of optimal trade-offs between reliability and cost, as shown above.
It is important to note that while only 12 solutions were considered manually, the automatic
optimisation returned 366 optimal solutions, which in turn is only a small fraction of the total number
of solutions evaluated. By performing a cost-benefit analysis on these results, it is possible for the
designer to determine which is likely to be the most suitable design; in both the restricted and non-
restricted optimisation, HiP-HOPS discovered a better solution than any found by the manual analysis.
The solution shown above offers a 17% improvement in net benefit over the manual reference solution.
7 Comparison with state of the art
7.1 Safety Analysis
As described in section 2, HiP-HOPS is a compositional safety analysis technique. It is closely
analogous to the CFT and FPTC approaches, although unlike FPTC, HiP-HOPS is a deductive
technique and is thus less prone to combinatorial explosion. It currently lacks the ability to analyse
systems with states and state transitions as in SEFTs, though there have been recent developments in
adding temporal logic capabilities to HiP-HOPS, but it is capable of dealing with NOT gates and non-
coherent fault trees [41]. However, unlike SEFTs, HiP-HOPS can make use of well-tested, high
performance FTA algorithms since it does not need to take into account the complexities of dynamic
state transitions in the system. Like most of these other approaches (but not FPTN), HiP-HOPS also
benefits from making use of the architectural design model rather than having to build a separate error
model for the purposes of safety analysis. One of the major advantages of HiP-HOPS, however, is the
type of output it produces; HiP-HOPS does not rely on external tools or other representations like Petri
Nets to perform the analysis, and instead produces both fault trees and FMEAs directly. The fault tree
analysis results include both the fault trees themselves as well as their cut sets and unavailability
estimates for the system failures, while the FMEA results include not only the direct effects of failures,
but also the further effects they may have in conjunction with other failures.
Compared to the formal model checking & fault simulation approaches like Altarica and FSAP-
NuSMV etc, HiP-HOPS requires a manual annotation phase before analysis & synthesis can take place;
however, the benefit of this is that more sophisticated failure logic can be modelled and the system
designer can ensure that the failure behaviour in the model is a more accurate reflection of the design
intentions. In addition, because the fault simulation model is the same as the nominal system model,
both are typically specified in a custom modelling language which is not always compatible with other
design languages and tools. Since HiP-HOPS focuses only on failure modelling, it can more easily
complement other design languages and tools that focus primarily on nominal behaviour. It is because
of this that HiP-HOPS can easily be integrated with simulation tools like SimulationX.
The other advantage of HiP-HOPS over the simulation approaches is related to its optimisation
capabilities. During optimisation, tens and even hundreds of thousands of different solutions need to be
evaluated quickly, meaning that tool performance is critical. Fault simulation techniques are primarily
inductive in nature, looking at the effects on system behaviour caused by the injection of single faults;
this is typically slower than deductive methods like HiP-HOPS that work backwards from system
failures to determine their causes, particularly for larger systems where combinatorial explosion is
more of an issue. Although fault tree analysis can still be time consuming, HiP-HOPS can usually
analyse even complex models with thousands of failure modes in a few seconds, which is critical for
use in optimisation where execution times are magnified a thousand-fold due to the number of
iterations involved.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that other techniques have no place. For example, HiP-HOPS could
first be used to identify potential design candidates using deductive safety analysis techniques and
automatic optimisation, and then a selection of the optimal solutions could be subjected to a more
rigorous simulation to better understand their nominal and failure behaviour.
7.2 Optimisation
In addition to its safety analysis features, HiP-HOPS has recently been extended with automatic
architectural optimisation capabilities, allowing system designs to be evolved with respect to reliability
and cost. It has so far been tested on both established benchmark problems [42] and smaller case
studies like the fuel oil system presented above. Although it is too premature to comment on overall
performance, as its scalability to larger, real-world systems is still being investigated, the successful
results so far indicate that combining automatic evolutionary algorithms for design optimisation with
modern safety analysis techniques may offer significant benefits for safety-driven design of critical
systems.
By contrast to the integrated safety analysis & optimisation capabilities found in HiP-HOPS, other
approaches to architectural optimisation [42-44] typically calculate reliability from manually
constructed Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs), in which systems are represented as series-parallel
configurations of components that possess a single failure mode and thus either function or fail. This is
both an additional time-consuming modelling step and offers only limited expressive power to
represent the real failure behaviour of the systems in question. In HiP-HOPS, the optimisation can
manipulate the actual system topology, within limits defined by the failure and optimisation parameters
defined for each component, meaning that the architecture itself can change to make use of established
design patterns like voters and redundant components in primary/standby configurations etc, in
addition to the simple replication and substitution found in other approaches. This also means that the
models are not limited to simple series-parallel configurations but can use more complex connection
topologies and hierarchically nested subsystems. Furthermore, the safety analysis capabilities of HiP-
HOPS are not limited to single failure modes and allow for a more sophisticated failure logic including
many different classes of failure modes, including omissions, commissions, value errors and timing
errors, that may be combined and transformed during their propagation through the system. These more
realistic failure assumptions, we believe, will help to improve the quality of the solutions reached by
this type of analysis.
8 Conclusion
Given the increasing scale and complexity of modern engineering systems, together with more
stringent safety constraints and increasing pressures on design lifetimes and budgets, tool automation
can offer significant benefits. Safety analysis tools can be a valuable aid in ensuring that system
designs meet their safety goals, helping to identify potential flaws and weaknesses in early design
iterations where corrective measures can more easily and more cheaply be carried out. The safety
analysis features of HiP-HOPS make use of fast, deductive analysis techniques like FTA to
automatically produce comprehensive information about the failure behaviour of a system. In addition,
this analysis takes place on the actual architectural model of the system, although some additional
annotation is required to detail the local failure data for the components in the system. This means that
no separate error model is required and the failure data, once annotated, can be stored in normal
component libraries and reused in different models and contexts with at most minor modifications,
resulting in important savings in time and effort.
However, even though safety analysis tools like HiP-HOPS can help to ensure that safety is included as
a driving factor in each iteration of the design, the iterations themselves remain a manual process,
relying on the intuition and experience of the designers to evolve the system in a productive way.
Design optimisation tools offer a way of accelerating this process by automatically investigating many
more design possibilities than would be possible to evaluate manually; by adding some additional
information to the system model to define the search space, modern evolutionary optimisation
techniques like genetic algorithms can quickly and efficiently explore that search space to identify
optimal solutions that feature improved trade-offs between conflicting objectives like cost and
reliability. These solutions can then be investigated more closely by the designers and used as the basis
for the next iteration of the system design.
The recent optimisation extensions to HiP-HOPS present a unique capability: by combining fast safety
analysis abilities with state-of-the-art optimisation technology, it becomes possible to evaluate and
optimise system models with regard to multiple objectives like cost and reliability within the same tool,
resulting in a more integrated process with better performance. Although the technology is still
experimental and only preliminary results have been obtained, they suggest that this type of combined
analysis & optimisation automation potentially offers great advantages to designers of modern safety-
critical systems. We hope to conduct further research to refine and enhance these optimisation
capabilities to allow them to be scaled up to larger, more complex systems and to ensure they produce
useful results for real-world engineering systems such as those found in the marine and automotive
transport industries.
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